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Abstract—The reliability and security of a user in an intercon-
nected system depends on all users’ collective effort in security.
Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic
users is typically modeled as a public good problem, known as
the Interdependent Security (IDS) game. The equilibria for such
games are often inefficient, as selfish users free-ride on positive
externalities of others’ contributions. In this paper, we present a
mechanism that implements the socially optimal equilibrium in
an IDS game through a message exchange process, in which users
submit proposals about the security investment and tax/price
profiles of one another. This mechanism is different from existing
solutions in that (1) it results in socially optimal levels of
investment, closing the Price of Anarchy gap in the IDS game, (2)
it is applicable to a general model of user interdependencies. We
further consider the issue of individual rationality, often a trivial
condition to satisfy in many resource allocation problems, and
argue that with positive externality, the incentive to stay out and
free-ride on others’ investment can make individual rationality
much harder to satisfy in designing a mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the rapid growth of the Internet, networks
of all kinds, and file sharing systems, the security of a user,
or entity, or a network1, in the context of a bigger system
of connected users, entities or networks, is no longer solely
determined by that user’s own investment in security, but
becomes increasingly dependent on the effort exerted by the
collection of interconnected users. Accordingly, the security
and reliability of the interconnected system is viewed as a
public good, for which the investments in security exhibit
a positive externality effect: the investment of one user on
security technologies will also improve the security posture
of the other users interacting with it. Consequently, strategic
users can choose to free-ride on others’ effort, resulting in an
overall under-investment in security.
This problem of (under-)investment in security by an inter-
connected group of selfish users, both in general as well as in
the context of computer security, has been extensively studied
in the framework of game theory, see e.g. [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], and is often referred to as the Interdependent
Security (IDS) game. IDS games were first presented by
Kunreuther and Heal [1] to study the incentive of airlines
to invest in baggage checking systems, and by Varian [2] in
the context of computer system reliability. In the majority of
1These terms are used interchangeably in this paper to denote a single unit
in a connected system.
these papers, under-investment in security is verified by finding
the levels of effort exerted in a Nash equilibrium of the IDS
game, and comparing them with the socially optimal levels of
investment.
The increasing number of unprotected devices connected to
the Internet, the constant emergence of new security threats,
and the insufficiency of improved security technologies in
compensating for the under-investment problem [7], motivates
the study of mechanisms for improving network security.
Several methods for increasing users’ investments, and thus the
reliability of the interconnected system, have been proposed in
the literature. These mechanisms fall into two main categories,
based on whether they incentivize or dictate user cooperation.
Mechanisms that dictate user investment in security, e.g.
regulations, audits, and third party inspections [8], leverage the
power of an authority such as the government or an Internet
service provider (ISP). These methods are only effective if the
authority has enough power to accurately monitor users and
establish a credible threat of punishment.
Among the mechanisms that incentivize user investment
in security, cyberinsurance is one of the most commonly
studied approaches [1], [9], [8]. Using insurance, users transfer
part of the security risks to an insurer in return for paying
a premium fee. Cyberinsurance is affected by the classic
insurance problems of adverse selection (higher risk users
seek more protection) and moral hazard (users lower their
investment in self-protection after being insured). Therefore,
the insurance company needs to somehow mitigate the infor-
mation asymmetry and calculate the premium fees with these
considerations in mind. An example of such solutions is when
an insurer chooses to monitor investments and/or inspect users’
devices to prevent the moral hazard problem, specifying the
terms of the contract accordingly to ensure appropriate levels
of investment in self-protection [1].
A method similar to insurance is proposed in [3], where
a certifying authority classifies users based on whether or
not they have made security investments, and ensures that
certified users get adequate compensation in case of a security
incident. Another theoretically attractive incentive mechanism
that may result in optimal levels of investment is the liability
rule [1], [2], where users are required to compensate others
for the damages caused by their under-investment in security.
However, these mechanisms are costly in that it is difficult
to accurately determine the cause of a damage. Alternatively,
[2] proposes assigning a level of due care, in which following
a security incident, a user is penalized only if its level of
investment is lower than a pre-specified threshold. Finally,
users can be incentivized to invest in security if they are
assigned bonuses/penalties based on their security outcome
(e.g. users get a reward if their security has not been breached),
or get subsidized/fined based on their effort (e.g. users are
given discounts if they buy security products) [5].
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to
the security investment problem. Specifically, we present a
game form, consisting of a message exchange process and
an outcome function, through which users converge to an
equilibrium where they make the socially optimal levels of
investment in security. Our method is different from the
previous solutions in several ways, highlighted as follows.
1) The proposed mechanism is applicable to the general
model of interdependence proposed in [7]. This model
allows continuous levels of effort (as opposed to a binary
decision of whether or not to invest in security [1], [3],
[6]).
2) It does not assume perfect protection once investment is
made (unlike epidemic models [1], [8]). Another similar
assumption is to decompose the risks of a user into
direct and indirect (i.e. spreading from another infected
user) risks, and assume perfect protection against direct
risks only [8]. Nevertheless, none of these models can be
descriptive of an IDS game, as no security technology
can provide perfect protection against all threads.
3) It models the heterogeneity in users’ preferences and
their importance to the system by allowing for a more
general utility function (in contrast to [1], [2], [4], [5],
[9], [6]).
4) This mechanism not only improves the levels of invest-
ment (as also done in [7]), but in fact results in socially
optimal investments in security.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present a model for the IDS game. We introduce the
concept of price of anarchy in Section III, and highlight the
inefficiency of Nash equilibria in an unregulated IDS game
through a simple example. We discuss the decentralized mech-
anism and its optimality in Section IV. Section V illustrates
that such optimal mechanism may fail to be individually
rational, typically a trivial requirement in many other settings.
Section VI concludes the paper with directions for future
work.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a collection of N users; this collection will also
be referred to as the system. Each user i can choose a level
xi ≥ 0 of effort/investment in security, incurring a cost ci >
0 per unit of investment. Let x = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} denote
the vector of investments. A user i’s security risk function
is denoted by fi(x). The security risk function models the
expected losses of an individual in case of a security breach.
These functions vary among users depending on both their
security interdependencies and their valuations of security. We
make the following assumptions about the functions fi(·):
Assumption 1: fi(·) > 0 is differentiable and decreasing in
xj , for all i and all j.
The assumption of ∂fi/∂xj < 0 models the positive external-
ities of security investments.
Assumption 2: fi(·) is strictly convex.
The assumption of convexity means that initial investment in
security offers considerable protection to the users [8], [10].
However, even with high effort, it is difficult to reduce the cost
to zero, as there is no strategy that could prevent all malicious
activity [7], [10].
The utility function of a user i is defined as:
ui(x) = −fi(x)− cixi − ti . (1)
In (1), gi(x) := fi(x)+cixi is referred to as the cost function
of user i [7], and represents all the costs associated with
security investments and breaches. The term ti is the monetary
transfer that can be imposed on/awarded to users throughout
the mechanism, which may itself depend on the vector of
investments x (as detailed shortly). This term is commonly
known as numeraire commodity in the literature of mechanism
design [11], as opposed to the commodity of interest, which
are the security investments in our context. To illustrate the
purpose of including this term in a user’s utility function,
note that externalities are defined as the side-effects of users’
actions on one another, the costs or benefits of which are
not accounted for when users pick their actions. A numeraire
commodity is often used in problems involving externalities
to bring such side-effects into strategic individuals’ decision
making process, a tactic referred to as “internalizing the
externalities”.
We make the following assumptions about the users:
Assumption 3: All users i are strategic, and choose their
investment xi in order to maximize their own utility function
(1).
Assumption 4: The cost ci and the functional form of fi(·)
are user i’s private information.
The Interdependent Security (IDS) game induced among
these N strategic players is defined as the strategic game
({1, . . . , N}, {xi ≥ 0}, {ui(·)}). The socially optimal vector
of security investments in this N user system is the vector x∗
maximizing the social welfare, as determined by the solution
to the following centralized problem:
max
(x,t)
N∑
i=1
ui(x)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ti = 0 , x  0 .
≡ min
x
N∑
i=1
gi(x)
s.t. x  0 . (2)
In other words, socially optimal solutions minimize the social
cost G(x) :=
∑N
i=1 gi(x). By Assumption 2, there is a unique
socially optimal investment profile x∗ for Problem (2). Also,
due to Assumptions 3 and 4, there is no individual/user in the
system with enough information to determine x∗.
Accordingly, our goal is to find a mechanism, run by a
manager/regulator, such that the induced interdependent secu-
rity game has as its equilibrium the solution to the centralized
problem (2) (also referred to as “implementing” the solution
to (2)).
To determine the effort that users exert in an IDS game,
with or without regulation (i.e., ti = 0, ∀i), we will consider
the vector of investments x in a Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the game ({1, . . . , N}, {xi ≥ 0}, {ui(·)}). Theoretically,
Nash equilibria describe users’ actions in a game of complete
information. However, due to Assumption 4, the model studied
herein is one of incomplete information. The Nash equilibrium
in this game can be interpreted as the convergence point of an
iterative process, in which each user adjusts its action at each
round based on its observations of other users’ actions, until
unilateral deviations are no longer profitable [12], [7].2
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the IDS game is a
vector of investments x¯, for which,
ui(x¯i, x¯−i) ≥ ui(xi, x¯−i), ∀xi ≥ 0, ∀i . (3)
We first ensure that the game studied indeed has a Nash
equilibrium in the following result. The proof can be found in
the Appendix.
Proposition 1: There always exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in an unregulated (i.e. ti = 0, ∀i) IDS game
modeled in this section.
III. PRICE OF ANARCHY IN AN UNREGULATED IDS GAME
Existence notwithstanding, the Nash equilibria of an unreg-
ulated IDS game are often inefficient. A common metric for
quantifying the inefficiency of such equilibria is the Price of
Anarchy (PoA), defined as the largest possible ratio between
the worst possible social cost at a Nash equilibrium x¯ and at
the social optimum x∗. Formally, PoA ρ is defined as:
ρ = max
x¯
ρ(x¯) ,
ρ(x¯) :=
G(x¯)
G(x∗)
=
∑N
i=1 gi(x¯)∑N
i=1 gi(x
∗)
. (4)
In [7], the authors characterize the price of anarchy in an
unregulated IDS game, i.e., the game in which no external
mechanism is implemented. The NE of this game is defined
in the same way as in (3), with ui(·) replaced by −gi(·). This
means that without regulation, users selfishly pick effort levels
that minimize their own cost. As a result, ρ > 1 for several
plausible risk function models ([7, Lemma 1, Propositions 2,
3], reflecting under-investment in security. Below we present
such an example, different from the aforementioned results
presented in [7], and chosen for its simplicity.
2Alternatively, one may relax Assumption 4 and study a game of complete
information, as is done in the majority of the current literature on IDS games.
Consider N interconnected users, and a total effort model
for users’ risk function, such that
fi(x) = f(
N∑
j=1
xj), ∀i.
Furthermore, without loss of generality, assume c1 < c2 <
· · · < cN . At the Nash equilibrium of this game, each user
will choose a level of investment xi ≥ 0 to minimize its own
cost. Therefore, at the Nash equilibrium x¯ we must have:
x¯i = 0 if
∂f(x¯i, x¯−i)
∂xi
+ ci > 0 ,
x¯i > 0 if
∂f(x¯i, x¯−i)
∂xi
+ ci = 0 .
We conclude that only the user with the lowest cost will be
exerting a non-zero effort at the Nash equilibrium x¯. Thus:
∂f(x¯1,0)/∂x1 = −c1, and x¯j = 0, ∀j > 1 .
At the socially optimal equilibrium x∗ on the other hand,
the levels of investment are determined by:
x∗i = 0 if N
∂f(x∗i ,x
∗
−i)
∂xi
+ ci > 0 ,
x∗i > 0 if N
∂f(x∗i ,x
∗
−i)
∂xi
+ ci = 0 .
Again the user with the lowest cost will be exerting all
the effort at the equilibrium x∗, however at a higher level,
determined by:
∂f(x∗1,0)/∂x1 = −c1/N, and x∗j = 0, ∀j > 1 .
The price of anarchy will therefore be given by:
ρ =
N f(x¯1,0) + c1x¯1
N f(x∗1,0) + c1x
∗
1
.
By the strict convexity of f(·), we have:
f(x¯1,0)− f(x
∗
1,0) >
∂f(x∗1,0)
∂x1
(x¯1 − x
∗
1) .
Hence, ρ > 1. Figure 1 illustrates the levels of investment
in both the socially optimal and the Nash equilibrium of
this game. Based on fig. 1, it is easy to observe the under-
investment in security in the Nash equilibrium of an unregu-
lated game.
In the next section, we present a mechanism under which
all Nash equilibria of the induced IDS game coincide with the
socially optimal solution, i.e., we will have ρ = 1, closing the
price of anarchy gap.
IV. A POSITIVE EXTERNALITY SECURITY INVESTMENT
MECHANISM (PESIM)
In this section, we present a mechanism that implements
the socially optimal solution to (2) in an informationally
decentralized setting. This mechanism is adapted from [12],
[13].
A decentralized mechanism is specified by a game form
(M, h).
Nash equilibrium vs. socially optimal investments
c1
N
c1
x¯1 x
∗
1
−
∂f
∂x1
Fig. 1. Under-investment in security in an unregulated IDS game.
• The message space M := ΠNi=1Mi specifies the set of
permissible messages Mi for each user i.
• The outcome function h : M → A determines the
outcome of the game based on the users’ messages. Here,
A is the space of all security investment profiles and tax
profiles, i.e., (x, t).
The game form, together with the utility functions, define a
game, represented by (M, h(·), {ui(·)}). This will also be
referred to as the regulated IDS game.
We say the message profile m∗ is a Nash equilibrium of
this game, if
ui(h(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i)) ≥ ui(h(mi,m
∗
−i)), ∀mi, ∀i . (5)
The components of the proposed decentralized PESIM
mechanism are specified as follows.
The Message Space: Each user i reports a message mi :=
(pii,xi) to the regulator, with pii ∈ RN+ and xi ∈ RN .
The component xi is user i’s proposal regarding the public
good, i.e., the security investment profile, while pii is user i’s
suggestion regarding the private good, i.e., the price profile3.
The Outcome Function: The outcome function h takes
the message profile m as input and determines the security
investment profile xˆ and the tax profile tˆ as follows:
xˆ(m) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi , (6)
tˆi(m) = (pii+1 − pii+2)
T
xˆ(m)
+ (xi − xi+1)
T diag(pii)(xi − xi+1)
− (xi+1 − xi+2)
T diag(pii+1)(xi+1 − xi+2), ∀i. (7)
In (7), for simplicity N +1 and N +2 are treated as 1 and 2,
respectively. That is, N + 1 denotes the modulo (N mod 1),
and so on.
This outcome function is interpreted as follows: first, (6)
states that the contribution xˆi of each user i to the public
good vector of investments xˆ is determined by the average
of all users’ proposals. The taxation term (7) is then used to
3Note the use of the term price profile for the vectors pii. As illustrated
later, these terms are closely related to Lindhal prices, and will in turn be
used to determine a tax profile t.
make sure that all investment profile proposals xi are the same
at equilibrium, and are equal to the socially optimal security
investments.
The tax term for user i itself consists of three different
terms. The first term (pii+1 −pii+2)T xˆ(m) is independent of
user i’s proposal for prices, and depends only on the invest-
ment profile4. The second term determines the penalties for the
discrepancy between user i’s proposal xi and user (i + 1)’s
proposal. This term will ensure eventual agreement between
investment proposals put forward by different users. The third
term does not depend on user i’s message, and is used only as
a balancing term. In fact, at equilibrium, both the second and
third terms will be equal to zero. Nevertheless, their inclusion
is necessary to ensure convergence to the optimal security
investment profile, and also for budget balance (i.e., the sum
of all taxes equal zero) on and off the equilibrium. Note that
having budget balance off equilibrium is an important property
of the proposed mechanism, in order to prevent complications
in an iterative message exchange process that leads to the
desired Nash equilibrium.
We would also like to highlight the close relation between
the tax term proposed in (7) and the positive externalities
of users’ actions. As illustrated later, at an equilibrium of
the PESIM mechanism, the second and third terms in (7)
disappear, so that the tax tˆi for user i reduces to tˆi = l∗i
T
xˆ,
where l∗i := pi∗i+1 − pi∗i+2 is known as the Lindhal price for
user i. Furthermore, when users’ monetary taxes are assessed
according to Lindhal prices, the socially optimal investments
x
∗ will be individually optimal as well, i.e.,5
x
∗ = argmin
x0
gi(x) + l
∗
i
T
x . (8)
As a result, it is easy to show that for all i, and all j for which
xˆj 6= 0,
∂gi(xˆ)
∂xj
< 0⇒ l∗i j > 0⇒ l
∗
i j xˆ
∗
j > 0 . (9)
The interpretation of this observation is that by implementing
the PESIM mechanism, user i will be paying a monetary tax
to user j, which is proportional to the positive externality of
j’s investment on user i’s costs (9).
It should be pointed out that for the time being, we have
assumed users’ participation in the mechanism is ensured,
either through policy mandate (e.g., the government may
require users to participate in the mechanism as a prerequi-
site for conducting business with it), or secondary financial
incentive (e.g., product discount for joining the collection of
users interested in the mechanism), such that the incentive
for participation is separate from the mechanism itself. In
Section V, we present a counter-example to illustrate why the
individual rationality constraint, i.e., the condition that a user
is better off by participating than staying out, may fail to hold,
and discuss some implications of this observation.
4
pii+1−pii+2 is interpreted as the Lindhal price for the public good [13].
5See proof of Theorem 1 presented later in this section for the derivation
of this result.
We close this section by presenting the theorems that
establish the optimality of the proposed game form. Note that
to prove this optimality, we first need to show that a profile
(xˆ(m∗), tˆ(m∗)), derived at the NE m∗ of the induced game,
is an optimal solution to the centralized problem (2), and
therefore socially optimal. Furthermore, as the procedure for
convergence to NE is not specified, we need to verify that
the optimality property holds for all Nash equilibrium of the
message exchange process. This guarantees that the outcome
will converge to the socially optimal solution regardless of
the realized NE. These two requirements are established in
Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1: Let (xˆ(m∗), tˆ(m∗)) be the investment and tax
profiles obtained at the Nash equilibrium m∗ of the game
(M, h(·), {ui(·)}). Then, (xˆ, tˆ) is an optimal solution to the
centralized problem (2). Furthermore, if m¯ is any other Nash
equilibrium of the proposed game, then xˆ(m¯) = xˆ(m∗).
Proof: Let m∗ be a Nash equilibrium of the message ex-
change process, resulting in an allocation (xˆ, tˆ). Assume user
i updates its message from m∗i = (pi∗i ,x∗i ) to mi = (pii,x∗i ),
that is, it only updates the price vector proposal. Therefore,
according to (6), xˆ will remain fixed, while based on (7), the
second term in tˆi will change. Since m∗ is an NE, unilateral
deviations are not profitable. Mathematically,
(x∗i − x
∗
i+1)
T diag(pi∗i )(x∗i − x∗i+1)
≤ (x∗i − x
∗
i+1)
T diag(pii)(x∗i − x∗i+1), ∀pii  0 . (10)
Hence, from (10) we conclude that for all i:
x
∗
i = x
∗
i+1 or pi
∗
i = 0 . (11)
Using (11) together with (7) we conclude that at equilibrium,
the second and third terms of a user’s tax vanish. Denoting
l
∗
i := pi
∗
i+1 − pi
∗
i+2, we get:
tˆi(m
∗) = l∗i
T
xˆ(m∗) . (12)
Now consider the utility function of the users at the Nash
equilibrium m∗. Since unilateral deviations are not profitable,
a user’s utility (1) should be maximized at the NE, i.e., for
any choice of xi and pii  0:
gi(xˆ(m
∗)) + l∗i
T
xˆ(m∗)
≤ gi(
xi +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
) + l∗i
T
xi +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
+(xi − x
∗
i+1)
T diag(pii)(xi − x∗i+1) (13)
If we choose pii = 0 and let xi = N · x−
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j , where x
is any vector of security investments, we get:
gi(xˆ(m
∗)) + l∗i
T
xˆ(m∗) ≤ gi(x) + l
∗
i
T
x, ∀x . (14)
To show that the Nash equilibrium m∗ results in a socially
optimal allocation, we sum up (14) over all i, and use the fact
that
∑
i l
∗
i = 0 to get:
N∑
i=1
gi(xˆ(m
∗)) ≤
N∑
i=1
gi(x), ∀x . (15)
Therefore, xˆ(m∗) is the optimal investment profile minimizing
the social cost in problem (2). Furthermore, any tax profile t
satisfying the budget balance condition can be chosen as the
tax profile in the optimal solution. Since the tax terms (12) are
balanced, we conclude that (xˆ(m∗), tˆ(m∗)) solves (2) and is
therefore socially optimal. Finally, since our choice of the NE
m
∗ has been arbitrary, the same proof holds for any other
NE, and thus all NE of the mechanism result in the optimal
solution to problem (2). 
Finally, we establish the converse of this statement in
Theorem 2, i.e., given an optimal investment profile, there
exists an NE of the proposed game which implements this
solution.
Theorem 2: Let x∗ be the optimal investment profile in the
solution to the centralized problem (2). Then, there exists at
least one Nash equilibrium m∗ of the game (M, h(·), {ui(·)})
such that xˆ(m∗) = x∗.
The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
V. ON INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Thus far, we have assumed user participation in the message
exchange process is ensured using external incentive mech-
anisms. Alternatively, one could try to guarantee voluntary
participation of strategic users by establishing that the so-
called individual rationality condition is satisfied, i.e., users
gain when participating in the mechanism as opposed to
staying out.
Whether a mechanism is individually rational depends on
the structure of the game form, as well as the actions available
to users when opting out. A common assumption in the
majority of public good and resource allocation problems,
including the prior work on the decentralized mechanism
presented in Section IV ([13], [14], [12]), is that users will
get a zero share (of the public good or allotted resources)
when staying out. Following this assumption, [13], [14], [12]
establish the individual rationality of the presented mechanism.
However, a similar line of reasoning is not applicable to the
current problem.
The different nature of individual rationality in an IDS game
can be intuitively explained as follows. By implementing a
socially optimal equilibrium, (some) users will be required to
increase their level of investment in security. In turn, the mech-
anism should either guarantee that these users enjoy a higher
level of protection due to higher equilibrium investments from
other participants, and/or are adequately compensated for their
contribution by a monetary reward (negative taxation). On the
other hand, by staying out, a user can still enjoy the positive
externalities of other users’ investments (although these may
be lower when the mechanism has partial coverage), choose its
optimal action accordingly, and possibly avoid taxation. Thus
to establish individual rationality in such an IDS game is not
nearly as trivial as in previous studies.
Indeed, the following counter-example shows that the bene-
fits of staying out can overthrow that of participation, making
a user better off when acting as a “loner”.
Specifically, a loner is a user who refuses to participate
in the mechanism, and later best-responds to the socially
optimal strategy of the remaining N − 1 users who did
participate. Arguably, these N − 1 users could also revise
their strategy (investments) in response to this loner’s best-
response, leading to a sequential game. In this example we
will compare the loner’s utility in the socially optimal solution
when participating in the mechanism, versus the utility at the
outcome of the sequential game described above.
Consider a collection of N users. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume c1 < c2 < . . . < cN . Assume user 1 is
contemplating whether to participate or remain a free agent.
We further assume all users have the same risk function
fi(x) = exp (−
∑N
i=1 xi) (an instance of the total effort model
[2]).
It is easy to show that at the socially optimal solution x∗
to the N -player game, the user with the smallest cost would
exert all the effort (see e.g. Section III, or [2]), such that:
exp(−x∗1) = c1/N, x
∗
j = 0, ∀j > 1 .
By (12) in the proof of Theorem 1, the tax for user 1 is given
by:
t∗1 = l
∗
1
T
x
∗ = l∗11x
∗
1 .
Re-writing (14) in the proof of Theorem 1 as
x
∗ = argmin
x0
g1(x) + l
∗
1
T
x ,
and applying the KKT conditions, we conclude that:
l∗11 +
∂g1
∂x1
(x∗) = l∗11 − exp(−x
∗
1) + c1 = 0
⇒ l∗11 = −(1−
1
N
)c1 ⇒ t
∗
1 = −(1−
1
N
)c1x
∗
1 .
As expected, user 1 is getting a reward in this mechanism.
Now assume user 1 opts out of the decentralized mech-
anism. The remaining N − 1 users choose their strategies
assuming user 1 exerts an effort of x1. Then, by the nature of
the total effort game, the user with the smallest cost among
these N − 1 players will exert all the effort (if any) such that:
exp(−x1 − xˆ2) = c2/(N − 1), xˆj = 0, ∀j > 2 .
On the other hand, if user 1 is best responding to a choice of
x2, it chooses an effort according to:
exp(−xˆ1 − x2) = c1 .
Combining the last two equations, at an equilibrium xˆ of the
sequential game we have:
xˆ1 = arg min
x1≥0
exp(−x1−max{− ln
c2
N − 1
−x1, 0})+c1x1 .
From the above, we conclude that if − ln c2
N−1 is large enough,
that is, if without user 1’s participation, user 2 will exert
a sufficiently high effort, user 1 will choose to free-ride.
Otherwise, it may again exert all the effort, in which case
exp(−xˆ1) = c1.
Let us focus on this latter case. It is interesting to note that
the overall level of security in the sequential game is lower
than the coordinated socially optimal equilibrium.
We compare user 1’s utility under the two scenarios.
uIN1 (x
∗) = − exp (−x∗1)− c1x
∗
1 + (1−
1
N
)c1x
∗
1 .
uOUT1 (xˆ) = − exp (−xˆ1)− c1xˆ1.
Therefore,
uIN1 − u
OUT
1 = −(exp (−x
∗
1)− exp (−xˆ1))
−c1(x
∗
1 − xˆ1) + (1−
1
N
)c1x
∗
1
= −(
c1
N
− c1)− c1(− ln
c1
N
+ ln c1)
+(1−
1
N
)c1(− ln
c1
N
)
=
c1
N
(
(N − 1)(1 − ln c1)− lnN
)
.(16)
Based on (16), with any cost c1 ≥ exp(1), user 1’s utility will
decrease when participating, indicating that in this case the
decentralized mechanism fails to satisfy individual rationality.
In light of the above observation, we conclude that although
the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible and imple-
ments the socially optimal levels of investment in a Nash
equilibrium, it fails to satisfy individual rationality in general.
It remains an interesting question whether there are other
mechanisms which would satisfy all requirements simultane-
ously, or alternatively whether this is a more fundamental
challenge in designing mechanisms for resource allocation
with positive externalities. The answer should shed light on
questions such as whether security policies should be man-
dated (or alternatively incentivized), rather than being left to
users’ free will.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a decentralized mecha-
nism, through which we can find and implement the socially
optimal levels of investment in security in an interdependent
security game. This mechanism is especially attractive as it
is applicable to a wide range of user preferences, operates
without the need for collecting information about these pref-
erences, and does not need to centrally dictate the socially
optimal outcome. We further consider the issue of individual
rationality, often a trivial condition to satisfy in many resource
allocation problems. We provide a counter example under the
proposed mechanism, and argue that with positive externality,
the incentive to stay out and free-ride on others’ investment can
make individual rationality much harder to satisfy in designing
a mechanism.
The study of IDS games in the current framework can be
further continued in several directions. First, the procedure
and conditions under which the message exchange process
converges to a Nash equilibrium remains an open problem,
and is an interesting direction of future study. Alternatively,
one could switch focus to Bayesian Nash equilibrium as the
solution concept for games of incomplete information, to
better capture the uncertainty of users about their environ-
ment, including other users’ valuations of security and the
resources available to them. It is also interesting to study
how the information obtained from alternative resources, e.g.
IP blacklists, can help users attain a better understanding
of their security risks and consequently make more effective
investment decisions.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we present the proofs to Proposition 1 and
Theorem 2. The proof for Theorem 2 is technically similar to
that presented in [12], [13], and the proof of Proposition 1
follows from [7, Proposition 1].
Proof of Proposition 1
We first show that the strategy space xi ∈ [0,∞) of a user
i can be effectively reduced to a convex and compact set.
Let BRi(x−i) represent user i’s best response to the strate-
gies x−i  0 of all the other users. Define xˆi = fi(0)+ǫci , for
some ǫ > 0. By assumption 2, the functions fi(·) are convex,
and thus:
fi(0,x−i)− fi(xˆi,x−i) ≥ −xˆi
∂fi(xˆi,x−i)
∂xi
= −
fi(0) + ǫ
ci
∂fi(xˆi,x−i)
∂xi
.(17)
By assumption 1, fi(xˆi,x−i) ≥ 0, and fi(0,x−i) ≤ fi(0).
Therefore, (17) reduces to:
fi(0) ≥ −
fi(0) + ǫ
ci
∂fi(xˆi,x−i)
∂xi
. (18)
Equation (18) in turn implies that ∂fi(xˆi,x−i)
∂xi
+ ci > 0. There-
fore, since user i’s cost is increasing at xˆi, a best response to
minimize the cost should be such that BRi(x−i) ∈ [0, xˆi]. Let
xmax := maxi xˆi. We conclude that for all i, the strategy sets
can be effectively reduced to xi ∈ [0, xmax].
Since the strategy sets are non-empty, compact, and convex,
and as the utility functions (1) are continuous and concave in
xi, the unregulated IDS game will always have at least one
Nash equilibrium ([11, Proposition 8.D.3]). 
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the optimal security investment profile x∗ in the
solution to the centralized problem (2). Our goal is to show that
there indeed exists a Nash equilibrium m∗ of the mechanism
for which xˆ(m∗) = x∗.
We start by showing that given the investment profile x∗,
it is possible to find a vector of personalized (Lindhal) prices
l
∗
i , for each i, such that,
argmin
x0
gi(x) + l
∗
i
T
x = x∗ . (19)
First, we know that since x∗ is the solution to problem (2),
it should satisfy the following KKT conditions, where λi ∈
R
N
+ , ∀i:
N∑
i=1
(∇gi(x
∗)− λTi ) = 0 ,
λ
T
i x
∗ = 0 ∀i . (20)
Choose l∗i = −∇gi(x∗) + λ
T
i . Then,
l
∗
i +∇gi(x
∗)− λTi = 0 . (21)
Equations (20) and (21) together are the KKT conditions for
the convex optimization problem:
min
x0
gi(x) + l
∗
i
T
x . (22)
The KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for finding
the optimal solution to the convex optimization problem (22),
and thus we have found the personalized prices satisfying (19).
We now proceed to finding a Nash equilibrium m∗ im-
plementing the socially optimal solution x∗. Consider the
message profiles m∗i = (pi∗i ,x∗i ), for which x∗i = x∗, and
the price vector proposals pi∗i are found from the recursive
equations:
pi
∗
i+1 − pi
∗
i+2 = l
∗
i , ∀i . (23)
Here, l∗i are the personalized prices defined at the beginning of
the proof. The set of equations (23) always has a non-negative
set of solutions pi∗i  0, ∀i. This is because starting with a
large enough pi∗1, the remaining pi∗i can be determined using:6
pi
∗
i = pi
∗
i−1 − l
∗
i−2, ∀i ≥ 2 . (24)
Now, first note that by (22), for all choices of x  0, and
all users i, we have:
gi(x
∗) + l∗i
T
x
∗ ≤ gi(x) + l
∗
i
T
x . (25)
Particularly, if we pick x = xi+
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
,
gi(x
∗) + l∗i
T
x
∗
≤ gi(
xi +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
) + l∗i
T
xi +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
. (26)
Also, since by construction x∗i = x∗i+1, ∀i, the inequality is
preserved for any choice of pii  0, when the two additional
tax terms are added in as follows:
gi(x
∗) + l∗i
T
x
∗ + (x∗i − x
∗
i+1)
T diag(pi∗i )(x∗i − x∗i+1)
− (x∗i+1 − x
∗
i+2)
T diag(pi∗i+1)(x∗i+1 − x∗i+2)
≤ gi(
xi +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
) + l∗i
T
xi +
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
N
+ (xi − x
∗
i+1)
T diag(pii)(xi − x∗i+1)
− (x∗i+1 − x
∗
i+2)
T diag(pi∗i+1)(x∗i+1 − x∗i+2) . (27)
Equation (27) can be more concisely written as:
ui(h(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i)) ≥ ui(h(mi,m
∗
−i)) ,
∀mi = (pii,xi), ∀i . (28)
6In (24), l∗
0
is interpreted as l∗
N
.
We conclude that the messages m∗i = (pi∗i ,x∗) constitute an
NE of the proposed mechanism. In other words, the message
exchange process will indeed have an NE which implements
the socially optimal solution of problem (2). 
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